Last week, Pandalabs received a question about a specific family of ransomware that was using PowerShell, a Microsoft tool that is included in Windows 10 and that has been abused by cybercriminals for some time. We get these questions every now and then, we find those questions amusing as we consider ourselves the best ones stopping ransomware attacks. But to be honest I must admit we do not write that much about it as we should, we don’t share all our findings with the community, which is why we have decided to do it on a regular basis from now on in this “Tales of Ransomwhere” series.
it comes via a phishing email that has a Word document attached
The specific ransomware we were asked about sounded like old news to us, and in fact, our colleagues from Carbon Black wrote about it back in March. The attack flow is easy to follow: it comes via a phishing email that has a Word document attached. Once opened, a macro in the document will run cmd.exe to execute PowerShell, first to download a script from the Internet, and then will run PowerShell again using that downloaded script as input to perform the ransomware tasks.
This Powerware, as named by Carbon Black, is yet another ransomware of the thousands we see. We were blocking it even before we were aware of this particular family (as in 99.99% of the cases, did I already mention we are the best ones in the world stopping ransomware attacks?) although I have to admit that for some security companies this particular family is a bigger challenger than the rest. Why is that? Well, a number of these “Next Generation AVs” or whatever they call themselves, rely a lot on signatures (wait, weren’t they the ones that claim they do not use signatures?!?!) and at the same time their presence is stronger at the perimeter than at the endpoint. And as you can imagine, blocking Word documents at the perimeter is not really convenient. Once they have infected some customers they can add signatures and protect the rest (like blocking IPs where the script is being downloaded from) although the lack of a malware executable being downloaded from the Internet is a nightmare for them.
At the end of the day ransomware is a hell of a business for cybercriminals, and as such they invest a lot of resources into finding new ways to stay undetected by all kind of security solutions, being this Powerware just one example. The general behavior doesn’t change, but there are always subtle changes at least every week. These changes can apply to the ransomware itself (how it performs its actions) or the delivery (using new exploits, changing known exploits, changing the payload of the exploits, etc.)
A good example of new delivery methods is one we have seen recently: after exploiting Internet Explorer, it is executed CMD using the “echo” feature to create a script. Then a number of Windows files are executed in order to perform all actions to avoid detection of suspicious behavior by security solutions. The script is run by wscript, and it downloads a dll, then it uses CMD to run regsvr32, that will execute the dll (using rundll32). In most cases that DLL is a ransomware, so far we have blocked +500 infection attempts using this new trick.
so far we have blocked +500 infection attempts using this new trick
We haven’t looked at the exploit used (we really don’t care a lot as long as we are blocking it) but given the timeframe where this infection attempts have shown up (first on June 27th) it happened when AnglerEK had already disappeared, so probably attackers are using either Neutrino or Magnitude.
Every time we see something new like this, someone ends up publishing information about it a month later, so I am afraid we may have screwed up someone’s research, or at least it won’t look that new. To make up for it I have listed all the MD5s of the DLLs we have captured in the wild in those +500 infection attempts:
00d3a3cb7d003af0f52931f192998508
09fc4f2a6c05b3ab376fb310687099ce
1c0157ee4b861fc5887066dfc73fc3d7
1cda5e5de6518f68bf98dfcca04d1349
1db843ac14739bc2a3c91f652299538c
2c5550778d44df9a888382f32c519fe9
2dcb1a7b095124fa73a1a4bb9c2d5cb6
2f2ca33e04b5ac622a223d63a97192d2
38fb46845c2c135e2ccb41a199adbc2a
3ac5e4ca28f8a29c3d3234a034478766
4cb6c65f56eb4f6ddaebb4efc17a2227
562bf2f632f2662d144aad4dafc8e316
63dafdf41b6ff02267b62678829a44bb
67661eb72256b8f36deac4d9c0937f81
6dbc10dfa1ce3fb2ba8815a6a2fa0688
70e3abaf6175c470b384e7fd66f4ce39
783997157aee40be5674486a90ce09f2
7981aab439e80b89a461d6bf67582401
821b409d6b6838d0e78158b1e57f8e8c
96371a3f192729fd099ff9ba61950d4b
9d3bf048edacf14548a9b899812a2e41
a04081186912355b61f79a35a8f14356
a1aa1180390c98ba8dd72fa87ba43fd4
a68723bcb192e96db984b7c9eba9e2c1
abb71d93b8e0ff93e3d14a1a7b90cfbf
b1ac0c1064d9ca0881fd82f8e50bd3cb
b34f75716613b5c498b818db4881360e
b6e3feed51b61d147b8679bbd19038f4
bbf33b3074c1f3cf43a24d053e071bc5
cba169ffd1b92331cf5b8592c8ebcd6a
d4fee4a9d046e13d15a7fc00eea78222
d634ca7c73614d17d8a56e484a09e3b5
de15828ccbb7d3c81b3d768db2dec419
df92499518c0594a0f59b07fc4da697e
dfd9ea98fb0e998ad5eb72a1a0fd2442
e5c5c1a0077a66315c3a6be79299d835